¿Es Demasiado Tarde Para Solicitar la Ciudadanía y Votar en las Elecciones Presidenciales de 2020?

US Citizenship

Se está acabando el tiempo para completar el proceso de naturalización en los Estados Unidos a tiempo para votar en las elecciones presidenciales de 2020. Solicitar la naturalización, el proceso de convertirse en ciudadano de los EE. UU., Es un proceso lento que generalmente implica cuatro pasos principales:

  1. Presentando el formulario N-400, Solicitud de Naturalización
  2. Asistir a una cita de biometría para tomar huellas digitales y una foto
  3. Aprobar una entrevista y un examen en una oficina local de USCIS
  4. Asistir a una ceremonia de ciudadanía.

La razón por la cual este proceso es lento se debe casi por completo a los retrasos del gobierno en el procesamiento del papeleo. El retraso real depende de la oficina local que procesa la solicitud, ya que cada oficina tiene diferentes cargas de trabajo, niveles de personal y prácticas locales. Las estadísticas están disponibles en general en el sitio web de USCIS para los tiempos de procesamiento de casos. Para usar esa herramienta, elija el número de formulario N-400 y luego la oficina local de campo con jurisdicción sobre el área donde reside. Sin embargo, estas estadísticas son más como promedios y tienden a sobreestimar el tiempo de procesamiento para un caso simple.

Dicho esto, algunos casos tardan más. Algunas personas tienen que someterse a verificaciones de antecedentes más largas y autorizaciones de seguridad. Algunas personas son entrevistadas dos veces, por ejemplo, si no pasan su primera entrevista. Y finalmente, puede haber una demora antes de que se programe la ceremonia de ciudadanía, a veces varios meses. Ese último paso es clave, porque el proceso no está completo y la persona no es oficialmente ciudadana hasta que haya recibido su certificado en una ceremonia.

Una consideración final es que cada votante potencial debe primero convertirse en ciudadano y luego registrarse para votar. Cada estado tiene leyes sobre cuándo y cómo los votantes deben registrarse. Esos plazos pueden revisarse en sitios web como vote.org. Algunos ciudadanos nuevos pueden no ser conscientes de este requisito y se sentirán decepcionados si no pueden votar después de todo.

¿Ya es demasiado tarde para naturalizarse para votar en las elecciones de 2020? No necesariamente, pero puede ser para algunas personas. Los interesados ​​en votar deben hacer un esfuerzo para presentar lo antes posible.

Cambios en el Procesamiento de Peticiones Familiares I-130 en el Extranjero

Paperwork

La petición familiar I-130 normalmente se presenta dentro de los Estados Unidos en una oficina centralizada. En ciertas circunstancias, la petición puede presentarse directamente en el extranjero. Este proceso se está volviendo más difícil a medida que USCIS se mueve para cerrar muchas de sus oficinas internacionales. USCIS acaba de anunciar que delegó parte de su autoridad para procesar las peticiones familiares al Departamento de Estado. Ese cambio entró en vigencia el 1 de febrero de 2020.

Lo más probable es que las embajadas y consulados que procesen estas peticiones sean más lentas que las oficinas de USCIS en el extranjero, que a menudo toman decisiones mucho más rápido que USCIS en los estados. Lea el anuncio completo a continuación.

WASHINGTON — U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services today announced that, as part of the adjustment of its international footprint to increase efficiencies, Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, will only be processed domestically by USCIS or internationally by the Department of State in certain circumstances beginning Feb 1, 2020.  

DOS will assume responsibility for certain services previously provided at USCIS international offices, services that DOS already provide in countries where USCIS does not have a presence. Eligible active-duty service members assigned overseas will file their Form I-130 locally with DOS, as will certain non-military petitioners who meet specific criteria for consular processing.  

“USCIS continues to modernize and become more efficient as an agency,” said USCIS Deputy Director Mark Koumans. “Since the Department of State has a much larger international presence, we have delegated authority to our State partners to accept and adjudicate petitions for immediate relatives abroad in certain circumstances. USCIS continues to expand online filing options, which are available to those filing domestically or those filing from abroad, saving applicants and petitioners time and money.” 

Generally, DOS will process Form I-130 locally if the petition falls under blanket authorization criteria, as defined by USCIS:

Temporary blanket authorizations for instances of prolonged or severe civil strife or a natural disaster; or  

Blanket authorization for U.S. service members assigned to military bases abroad. 

In addition to these blanket authorizations, DOS maintains the discretion to accept Form I-130 if a U.S. citizen petitioner meets the “exceptional circumstance” criteria as outlined in the Policy Manual update. 

All other petitioners residing overseas must file Form I-130 online or by mail through the USCIS Dallas Lockbox facility for domestic processing.  

https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscis-updates-process-accepting-petitions-relatives-abroad

Nueva Prohibición de Viaje Emitida por Seis Países Adicionales

El 31 de enero de 2020, el presidente Donald Trump anunció que emitió una orden ejecutiva que prohibía a los ciudadanos de ciertos países viajar a los Estados Unidos. Esta prohibición de viajar sigue a una similar que se dirigió a países de mayoría musulmana en 2017 y que la Corte Suprema confirmó como constitucional.

Algunas de las características notables de esta prohibición son:

  • Afecta a nacionales de seis países: Birmania (Myanmar), Eritrea, Kirguistán, Nigeria, Sudán y Tanzania
  • La prohibición no es una prohibición completa, y afecta a cada país de manera algo diferente
  • Es posible que algunos países reaccionen y se eliminen de la lista, como ha sucedido en las prohibiciones de viaje anteriores.
  • Las prohibiciones de viaje para Birmania (Myanmar), Eritrea, Kirguistán y Nigeria solo se aplican a los inmigrantes, lo que significa que no deberían aplicarse a los viajeros temporales con visas de no inmigrante
  • Las prohibiciones de viaje para Tanzania y Sudán se aplican a los inmigrantes de diversidad, es decir, aquellos que solicitan tarjetas de residencia bajo el programa de visa de diversidad, y no a otros viajeros.
  • La fecha y hora de vigencia son las 12:01 am hora estándar del este del 21 de febrero de 2020
  • La razón de la prohibición es aparentemente que el gobierno de los Estados Unidos no está satisfecho con la cooperación de esos gobiernos para compartir información y ayudar en asuntos de seguridad nacional.
  • Las exenciones aún pueden estar disponibles para personas de estos países, incluso si se aplica la prohibición

Lea el pedido completo a continuación:

In Executive Order 13780 of March 6, 2017 (Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States), I temporarily suspended entry of nationals of certain specified countries and ordered a worldwide review of whether the United States would need additional information from each foreign country to assess adequately whether nationals of that foreign country seeking to enter the United States pose a security or public-safety threat to the United States, and if so, what additional information was needed.  The Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to Executive Order 13780 and in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, developed an assessment model using three categories of criteria to assess national security and public-safety threats:  whether a foreign government engages in reliable identity-management practices and shares relevant information; whether a foreign government shares national security and public-safety information; and whether a country otherwise poses a national security or public-safety risk.

Following a comprehensive worldwide review of the performance of approximately 200 countries using these criteria, the Secretary of Homeland Security presented the results of this review, focusing in particular on those countries that were deficient or at risk of becoming deficient in their performance under the assessment criteria.  After a subsequent period of diplomatic engagement on these issues by the Department of State, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security submitted a report in September 2017, which found that eight countries were hindering the ability of the United States Government to identify threats posed by foreign nationals attempting to enter the United States.  The Secretary of Homeland Security then recommended that I impose travel restrictions on certain nationals of those countries.  After consultation with relevant Cabinet officials and appropriate Assistants to the President, I issued Proclamation 9645 of September 24, 2017 (Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats).

In Proclamation 9645, I suspended and limited the entry into the United States of certain nationals of eight countries that failed to satisfy the criteria and were unable or unwilling to improve their information sharing, or that otherwise presented serious terrorism-related risks.  Those travel restrictions remain in effect today, with one exception.  On April 10, 2018, I issued Proclamation 9723 (Maintaining Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats), removing travel restrictions on nationals of the Republic of Chad.  Chad had improved its identity-management and information-sharing practices by taking steps to issue more secure passports and by increasing the integrity of how its government handles lost and stolen passports.  Chad also began to share information about known or suspected terrorists in a manner that makes that information available to the United States screening and vetting programs, and it created a new, standardized process for the United States to request relevant criminal information.

Pursuant to my directives in section 4 of Proclamation 9645, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has continued to assess every 180 days and report to me on whether the interests of the United States require the suspension of or limitation on entry of certain classes of foreign nationals.  DHS has also continued to assess ways to further improve its processes for measuring how countries perform under the assessment criteria.  From July 2018 through August 2019, DHS updated its methodology to assess compliance with the assessment criteria, which has allowed for more in-depth analysis and yields even more granularity and increased accuracy regarding each country’s performance under the criteria.

In this updated methodology, the general overall criteria for review have not changed.  The United States Government still expects all foreign governments to share needed identity-management information, to share national security and public-safety information, and to pass a security and public-safety risk assessment.  Building on experience and insight gained over the last 2 years, DHS has, however, refined and modified the specific performance metrics by which it assesses compliance with the above criteria.  For example, while the prior model determined whether a country shares certain needed information, the revised model accounts for how frequently the country shares that information and the extent to which that data contributes to border and immigration screening and vetting.  As another example, the prior system asked whether a country issued electronic passports at all, whereas the refined metrics assess whether a country issues electronic passports for all major classes of travel documents.  Similarly, the lost and stolen passports criterion previously assessed whether a country had prior instances of reporting loss or theft to the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), whereas the revised model now assesses whether the country has reported lost or stolen passports to INTERPOL within 30 days of a report of a loss or theft.

The DHS improvements to the assessment criteria also involve additional, and more customized, data from the United States Intelligence Community.  DHS’s original evaluation under Executive Order 13780 relied on existing intelligence products to assess the threat from each country.  With the benefit of 2 years of experience, DHS has worked closely with the Intelligence Community to define intelligence requirements and customize intelligence reporting that offers a detailed characterization of the relative risk of terrorist travel to the United States from each country in the world.  This additional detail improves DHS’s assessment of national security and public-safety risk.

In addition, DHS greatly increased the amount of information obtained from United States Embassies abroad, which work closely with foreign governments.  United States Embassies are best positioned to understand their host countries’ ability and willingness to provide information to the United States, and United States Embassies’ assessments contribute to a clearer understanding of how well a foreign government satisfies the assessment criteria.  DHS also consolidated statistical information on operational encounters with foreign nationals.  This information speaks to the frequency with which a country’s nationals commit offenses while in the United States or otherwise develop grounds for inadmissibility under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

Finally, as more precise, granular data became available, it became clear that many countries were only partially implementing each criterion.  The 2017 process had three basic potential compliance ratings for each criterion:  in compliance, out of compliance, or unknown.  The updated methodology allows the United States to account for ways in which countries partially comply with the metrics associated with each criterion.  As a result, for example, countries that DHS assessed in the 2017 review have now received more nuanced, partial compliance ratings.  In addition, the process now weighs each criterion and risk factor based on its degree of importance to the United States Government for conducting screening and vetting of visa applicants and other travelers to the United States.

Using this enhanced review process, DHS conducted its most recent, worldwide review pursuant to Proclamation 9645 between March 2019 and September 2019.  The process began on March 11, 2019, when the United States Government formally notified all foreign governments (except for Iran, Syria, and North Korea) about the refined performance metrics for the identity-management and information-sharing criteria.  After collecting information from foreign governments, multilateral organizations, United States Embassies, Federal law enforcement agencies, and the Intelligence Community, multiple subject matter experts reviewed each country’s data and measured its identity-management and information-sharing practices against the criteria.  DHS then applied the data to an algorithm it developed to consistently assess each country’s compliance with the criteria.

DHS identified the worst-performing countries for further interagency review and for an assessment of the potential impact of visa restrictions.  As in the worldwide review culminating in Proclamation 9645, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security assessed that Iraq did not meet the baseline for compliance.  As part of the interagency review process, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security determined, however, not to recommend entry restrictions and limitations for nationals of Iraq.  In his report, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security recognized a close cooperative relationship between the United States and the democratically elected government of Iraq, the strong United States diplomatic presence in Iraq, the significant presence of United States forces in Iraq, and Iraq’s commitment to combating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  The Acting Secretary of Homeland Security considered another similarly situated country and determined that, for reasons similar to those present in Iraq, entry restrictions and limitations would not be appropriate.

In addition, the United States Government, led by the Department of State, continued or increased engagements with many countries about those countries’ deficiencies.  A number of foreign governments sent senior officials to Washington, D.C., to discuss those issues, explore potential solutions, and convey views about obstacles to improving performance.  As a result of this engagement, one country made sufficient improvements in its information-sharing and identity-management practices and was removed from consideration for travel restrictions.

On September 13, 2019, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, after consulting with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other appropriate agencies, submitted a fourth report to me recommending the suspension of, or limitation on, the entry of certain classes of nationals from certain countries in order to protect United States national security, including by incentivizing those foreign governments to improve their practices.  The Acting Secretary of Homeland Security recommended maintaining the current restrictions on the seven countries announced in Proclamation 9645 (apart from Chad), as well as implementing suspensions and limitations on entry for certain nationals of twelve additional countries.

Since the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security issued his report on September 13, 2019, the Secretary of State, consistent with section 4(b) of Proclamation 9645, has continued to engage many foreign governments regarding the deficiencies identified in DHS’s report and has continued to consult with the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, and other Cabinet-level officials about how best to protect the national interest.  Based on these engagements, in January 2020, those senior officials recommended that I maintain the entry restrictions adopted in Proclamation 9645 (as modified by Proclamation 9723), and that I exercise my authority under section 212(f) of the INA to suspend entry into the United States for nationals of six new countries — Burma (Myanmar), Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tanzania — until those countries address their identified deficiencies.

The January 2020 proposal recommended visa restrictions on fewer countries than identified by the September 2019 DHS report.  For example, the January 2020 proposal recommended no entry restrictions on nationals of one country that had been recommended for restrictions in the September 2019 report.  This country made exceptional progress in correcting deficiencies since the September 2019 report, such that it could no longer be characterized as a country that is among those posing the highest degree of risk.  In addition, the January 2020 proposal recommended that, for five poorly performing countries, foreign policy interests warranted a different approach than recommended in the September 2019 report.  Specifically, the January 2020 proposal suggested that diplomatic engagement and requests for specific improvements during a defined 180-day period would be more appropriate and more likely to result in immediate improvements in these five countries.  Each of these five countries provides critical counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and therefore holds strategic importance in countering malign external actors.  In several of the five countries, the United States has experienced a recent deepening of diplomatic ties that generally mark increased cooperation toward achieving key regional and global United States foreign policy goals.  Importantly, all five countries have credibly communicated willingness to work directly with the United States Government to correct their outstanding deficiencies, and the United States believes progress is imminent for several countries and underway for others.  For these reasons, these countries will be given an opportunity to show specific improvements in their deficiencies within the next 180 days.

Consistent with recommendations contained in the January 2020 proposal, I have decided to leave unaltered the existing entry restrictions imposed by Proclamation 9645, as amended by Proclamation 9723, and to impose tailored entry restrictions and limitations on nationals from six additional countries.  I have decided not to impose any nonimmigrant visa restrictions for the newly identified countries, which substantially reduces the number of people affected by the proposed restrictions.  Like the seven countries that continue to face travel restrictions pursuant to Proclamation 9645, the six additional countries recommended for restrictions in the January 2020 proposal are among the worst performing in the world.  However, there are prospects for near-term improvement for these six countries.  Each has a functioning government and each maintains productive relations with the United States.  Most of the newly identified countries have expressed a willingness to work with the United States to address their deficiencies, although it may take some time to identify and implement specific solutions to resolve the deficiencies.

Consistent with the January 2020 proposal, I have prioritized restricting immigrant visa travel over nonimmigrant visa travel because of the challenges of removing an individual in the United States who was admitted with an immigrant visa if, after admission to the United States, the individual is discovered to have terrorist connections, criminal ties, or misrepresented information.  Because each of the six additional countries identified in the January 2020 proposal has deficiencies in sharing terrorist, criminal, or identity information, there is an unacceptable likelihood that information reflecting the fact that a visa applicant is a threat to national security or public safety may not be available at the time the visa or entry is approved.

For two newly identified countries that were among the highest risk countries, but performed somewhat better than others, I have decided, consistent with the January 2020 proposal, to suspend entry only of Diversity Immigrants, as described in section 203(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1153(c).  Such a suspension represents a less severe limit compared to a general restriction on immigrant visas, given the significantly fewer number of aliens affected.  The Acting Secretary of Homeland Security considers foreign-government-supplied information especially important for screening and vetting the Diversity Visa population in comparison to other immigrant visa applicants, and I agree with that assessment.  In many cases, the United States Government may not have the same amount of information about Diversity Visa applicants compared with other categories of immigrant visa applicants because Diversity Visa applicants, with limited exceptions, do not have the burden to show certain family ties to or employment in the United States, or particular service to the United States Government, as required for other immigrant visa categories.

Consistent with the January 2020 proposal, I have decided not to impose any restrictions on certain Special Immigrant Visas for nationals of the six newly identified countries.  Applicants under Special Immigrant programs generally do not need to demonstrate the same work or familial ties as other immigrant visas, but do need to show other unique qualifications.  This exception is intended to cover those Special Immigrants who have advanced United States interests (and their eligible family members), such as foreign nationals who have worked for a United States Embassy for 15 years or more and are especially deserving of a visa.

As President, I must continue to act to protect the security and interests of the United States and its people.  I remain committed to our ongoing efforts to engage those countries willing to cooperate, to improve information-sharing and identity-management protocols and procedures, and to address both terrorism-related and public-safety risks.  And I believe that the assessment process, including enhancements made to that process, leads to new partnerships that strengthen our immigration screening and vetting capabilities.  Until the countries identified in this proclamation satisfactorily address the identified deficiencies, I have determined, on the basis of a recommendation from the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security and other members of my Cabinet, to impose certain conditional restrictions and limitations on entry into the United States of nationals of the countries identified in section 1 of this proclamation, as set forth more fully below.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, hereby find that, absent the measures set forth in this proclamation, the immigrant entry into the United States of persons described in section 1 of this proclamation would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and that their entry should be subject to certain restrictions, limitations, and exceptions.  I therefore hereby proclaim the following:

    Section 1.  Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Identified Concern.   The entry into the United States of nationals of the following countries is hereby suspended and limited, as follows, subject to section 2 of this proclamation.

(a)  The entry suspensions and limitations enacted by section 2 of Proclamation 9645 are not altered by this proclamation, and they remain in force by their terms, except as modified by Proclamation 9723.

(b)  Burma (Myanmar)

(i)  Although Burma has begun to engage with the United States on a variety of identity-management and information-sharing issues, it does not comply with the established identity-management and information-sharing criteria assessed by the performance metrics.  Burma does not issue electronic passports nor does it adequately share several types of information, including public-safety and terrorism-related information, that are necessary for the protection of the national security and public safety of the United States.  Burma is in the process of modernizing its domestic identity-management and criminal-records systems and has worked with the United States to develop some of those systems.  It has also recognized the need to make improvements.  As its capabilities improve, the prospect for further bilateral cooperation will likely also increase.  Despite these encouraging prospects, Burma’s identified deficiencies create vulnerabilities that terrorists, criminals, and fraudulent entrants could exploit to harm United States national security and public safety.

(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Burma as immigrants, except as Special Immigrants whose eligibility is based on having provided assistance to the United States Government, is hereby suspended.

(c)  Eritrea

(i)  Eritrea does not comply with the established identity-management and information-sharing criteria assessed by the performance metrics.  Eritrea does not issue electronic passports or adequately share several types of information, including public-safety and terrorism-related information, that are necessary for the protection of the national security and public safety of the United States.  Further, Eritrea is currently subject to several nonimmigrant visa restrictions.  Eritrea does not accept return of its nationals subject to final orders of removal from the United States, which further magnifies the challenges of removing its nationals who have entered with immigrant visas.  Eritrea has engaged with the United States about its deficiencies, but it also requires significant reforms to its border security, travel-document security, and information-sharing infrastructure.  Improvements in these areas will increase its opportunities to come into compliance with the United States Government’s identity-management and information-sharing criteria.

(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Eritrea as immigrants, except as Special Immigrants whose eligibility is based on having provided assistance to the United States Government, is hereby suspended.

(d)  Kyrgyzstan

(i)  Kyrgyzstan does not comply with the established identity-management and information-sharing criteria assessed by the performance metrics.  Kyrgyzstan does not issue electronic passports or adequately share several types of information, including public-safety and terrorism-related information, that are necessary for the protection of the national security and public safety of the United States.  Kyrgyzstan also presents an elevated risk, relative to other countries in the world, of terrorist travel to the United States, though it has been responsive to United States diplomatic engagement on the need to make improvements.

(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Kyrgyzstan as immigrants, except as Special Immigrants whose eligibility is based on having provided assistance to the United States Government, is hereby suspended.

(e)  Nigeria

(i)  Nigeria does not comply with the established identity-management and information-sharing criteria assessed by the performance metrics.  Nigeria does not adequately share public-safety and terrorism-related information, which is necessary for the protection of the national security and public safety of the United States.  Nigeria also presents a high risk, relative to other countries in the world, of terrorist travel to the United States.  Nigeria is an important strategic partner in the global fight against terrorism, and the United States continues to engage with Nigeria on these and other issues.  The Department of State has provided significant assistance to Nigeria as it modernizes its border management capabilities, and the Government of Nigeria recognizes the importance of improving its information sharing with the United States.  Nevertheless, these investments have not yet resulted in sufficient improvements in Nigeria’s information sharing with the United States for border and immigration screening and vetting.

(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Nigeria as immigrants, except as Special Immigrants whose eligibility is based on having provided assistance to the United States Government, is hereby suspended.

(f)  Sudan

(i)  Sudan generally does not comply with our identity-management performance metrics and presents a high risk, relative to other countries in the world, of terrorist travel to the United States.  Sudan is, however, transitioning to civilian rule, a process which should improve opportunities for cooperation in the future, and it has already made progress in addressing its deficiencies in several areas.  For example, Sudan now issues electronic passports and has improved its coordination with INTERPOL in several respects.  Sudan has also shared exemplars of its passports with the United States and now permanently invalidates lost and stolen passports and fraudulently obtained travel documents.  Because Sudan performed somewhat better than the countries listed earlier in this proclamation and is making important reforms to its system of government, different travel restrictions are warranted.

(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Sudan as Diversity Immigrants, as described in section 203(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1153(c), is hereby suspended.

(g)  Tanzania

(i)  Tanzania does not comply with the established identity-management and information-sharing criteria assessed by the performance metrics.  Tanzania does not adequately share several types of information, including public-safety and terrorism-related information, that is necessary for the protection of the national security and public safety of the United States.  The Government of Tanzania’s significant failures to adequately share information with the United States and other countries about possible Ebola cases in its territory detract from my confidence in its ability to resolve these deficiencies.  Tanzania also presents an elevated risk, relative to other countries in the world, of terrorist travel to the United States.  Tanzania does, however, issue electronic passports for all major passport classes, reports lost and stolen travel documents to INTERPOL at least once a month, and has provided exemplars of its current passports to the United States.  Further, Tanzania does share some information with the United States, although its processes can be slow, overly bureaucratic, and complicated by limited technical capability.  In light of these considerations, different travel restrictions are warranted.

(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Tanzania as Diversity Immigrants, as described in section 203(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1153(c), is hereby suspended.

Sec. 2.  Scope and Implementation of Suspensions and Limitations.   (a)  Subject to the exceptions set forth in section 3(b) of Proclamation 9645, any waiver under section 3(c) of Proclamation 9645, and any enforcement provision of section 6(b) through (e) of Proclamation 9645, the suspensions of and limitations on entry pursuant to section 1(b) of this proclamation shall apply to foreign nationals of the designated countries who:

(i)    are outside the United States on the applicable effective date of this proclamation;

(ii)   do not have a valid visa on the applicable
effective date of this proclamation; and

(iii)  do not qualify for a visa or other valid travel document under section 6(d) of Proclamation 9645.

(b)  The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall coordinate to update guidance, if necessary, to implement this proclamation as to nationals of the six countries identified in section 1(b) of this proclamation, consistent with the provisions of this section.

(c)  For purposes of this proclamation, the phrase “Special Immigrants whose eligibility is based on having provided assistance to the United States Government” means those aliens described in section 101(a)(27)(D) through (G) and (K) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(D) through (G) and (K), any alien seeking to enter the United States pursuant to a Special Immigrant Visa in the SI or SQ classification, and any spouse and children of any such individual.

Sec. 3.  Reporting Requirements.    (a)  Section 4 of Proclamation 9645 is amended to read as follows:

“Sec. 4.  Adjustments to Removal of Suspensions and Limitations.

“(a)  The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall on October 1, 2020, and annually thereafter, submit to the President the results of an evaluation as to whether to continue, terminate, modify, or supplement any suspensions of, or limitations on, the entry on certain classes of nationals of countries identified in section 2 of this proclamation and section 1(b) of the Proclamation “Improving Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats,” signed on January 31, 2020.

“(b)  The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall not less than every 2 years evaluate whether each country in the world sufficiently shares relevant information and maintains adequate identity-management and information-sharing practices to mitigate the risk that its citizens or residents may travel to the United States in furtherance of criminal or terrorist objectives, or otherwise seek to violate any law of the United States through travel or immigration.  In doing so, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall:

“(i)   in consultation with the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence, report to the President, through the appropriate Assistants to the President, any instance in which, based on a review conducted under subsection (b) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security believes it is in the interests of the United States to suspend or limit the entry of certain classes of nationals of a country; and

“(ii)  in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, regularly review and update as necessary the criteria and methodology by which such evaluations are implemented to ensure they continue to protect the national interests of the United States.

“(c)  Notwithstanding the requirements set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence, may, at any time, recommend that the President impose, modify, or terminate a suspension or limitation on entry on certain classes of foreign nationals to protect the national interests of the United States.”

(b)  Section 5 of Proclamation 9645 is revoked.

Sec. 4.  Effective Date.   This proclamation is effective at 12:01 am eastern standard time on February 21, 2020.  With respect to the application of those provisions of Proclamation 9645 that are incorporated here through section 2 for countries designated in section 1(b), and that contained their own effective dates, those dates are correspondingly updated to be January 31, 2020, or February 21, 2020, as appropriate.

Sec. 5.  Severability.    It is the policy of the United States to enforce this proclamation to the maximum extent possible to advance the national security, foreign policy, and counterterrorism interests of the United States.  Accordingly:

(a)  if any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this proclamation and the application of its other provisions to any other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby; and

(b)  if any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid because of the lack of certain procedural requirements, the relevant executive branch officials shall implement those procedural requirements to conform with existing law and with any applicable court orders.

Sec. 6.  General Provisions.   (a)  Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i)    United States Government obligations under applicable international agreements;

(ii)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(iii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b)  This proclamation shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c)  This proclamation is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this thirty-first day of January, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-fourth.

DONALD J. TRUMP

https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-improving-enhanced-vetting-capabilities-processes-detecting-attempted-entry/

Decisión del BIA Sobre Ordenes en Ausencia, Matter of J.J. Rodriguez

El 31 de enero de 2020, el BIA emitió una decisión en materia de J.J. Rodríguez, 27 I&N, 762 de diciembre. El caso se refiere a procedimientos bajo los Protocolos de Protección de Migrantes, o MPP, que obligan a los solicitantes de asilo a esperar audiencias judiciales en condiciones peligrosas en México. En virtud de estos procedimientos, los solicitantes de asilo reciben fechas de corte en los Estados Unidos, como en San Diego, y luego se les lleva de vuelta a esperar en México. Se supone que deben presentarse en la frontera en esa fecha, momento en el que se les permitirá ingresar para la audiencia.

El juez de inmigración en materia de J.J. Rodríguez, evidentemente preocupado de que este acuerdo sea una privación de los derechos del debido proceso del individuo, se negó a ingresar una orden in absentia cuando el individuo no llegó a la audiencia judicial. Los abogados del Departamento de Seguridad Nacional apelaron esta decisión, y la Junta de Apelaciones de Inmigración estuvo de acuerdo. El impacto práctico de esta decisión puede ser limitado, ya que lo más probable es que los jueces ya hayan emitido órdenes in absentia cuando la gente no aparece en los casos bajo el MPP. Sin embargo, es otro recordatorio de la continua erosión del debido proceso y la completa falta de preocupación que tiene el sistema de tribunales de inmigración para que las personas tengan la mala suerte de quedar atrapados en él.

Lea la decisión completa aquí:

USCIS Anuncia la Implementación de la Regla de Carga Pública

Tras la suspensión de la orden judicial por parte de la Corte Suprema, USCIS ha comenzado nuevamente el proceso de implementación de su norma de carga pública. Esta regla tendrá efectos generalizados en la mayoría de las solicitudes de residencia permanente, también conocidas como tarjetas verdes. USCIS intentó anteriormente implementar la regla, pero fue ordenada por numerosos tribunales federales y se le impidió hacerlo. Por el momento, parece que la regla entrará en vigencia el 24 de febrero de 2020, y no entrará en vigencia en el estado de Illinois, donde todavía hay una orden judicial. Eso puede cambiar en las próximas semanas.

Lea el anuncio completo:

El Servicio de Ciudadanía e Inmigración de Estados Unidos implementará la regla final de Inadmisibilidad por Motivos de Carga Pública a partir del 24 de febrero de 2020, excepto en Illinois, donde la implementación de la regla permanece prohibida por un tribunal federal desde el 31 de enero de 2020. DHS ha solicitado ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones de Estados Unidos que suspenda ese mandato judicial preliminar a la luz de la decisión del Tribunal Supremo de suspender los mandatos judiciales preliminares en todo el país. USCIS proporcionará guías adicionales si se levanta el mandato judicial preliminar en Illinois.

Esto significa que USCIS solo aplicará la regla final a solicitudes y peticiones mataselladas (o a las enviadas en línea, si corresponde) en o después del 24 de febrero de 2020. Para las solicitudes y peticiones que fueron enviadas a través de mensajería comercial (como, por ejemplo, UPS, FedEx y DHL), la fecha del matasello es la fecha que aparece en el recibo de la compañía de mensajería. Después del 24 de febrero de 2020, excepto en Illinois, rechazaremos las ediciones anteriores de los formularios si están matasellados en o después del 24 de febrero de 2020. Si recibimos una solicitud o petición para la cual usó una edición incorrecta del formulario, el solicitante o peticionario tendrá que presentar una nueva solicitud o petición.

Además, al determinar si es probable que un extranjero se convierta en una carga pública en algún momento futuro, DHS no considerará la solicitud, certificación o aprobación del extranjero para recibir o haber recibido ciertos beneficios públicos no monetarios antes del 24 de febrero de 2020. Respecto a la condición de beneficios públicos de solicitudes o peticiones de extensión de estadía o cambio de estatus, DHS solo considerará los beneficios públicos recibidos en o después del 24 de febrero de 2020.

Estamos comprometidos con determinar el método de implementación más justo y más efectivo. Publicaremos los formularios actualizados, instrucciones de presentación de solicitudes, y guías del Manual de Políticas en el sitio web de USCIS las próximas semanas – mucho antes de la fecha de implementación – para darles a los solicitantes, peticionarios y otros, el tiempo suficiente para revisar los procedimientos y formularios actualizados.

Además, en las próximas semanas llevaremos a cabo una sesión de enlace público para el público y otros grupos de interés con el fin de asegurarnos que entienden la regla final.

https://www.uscis.gov/es/noticias/uscis-anuncia-la-implementacion-de-la-regla-de-carga-publica-luego-de-que-el-tribunal-supremo-suspendiera-los-mandatos-judiciales-preliminares-en-todo-el-pais

La Corte Suprema Permite Que Se Implemente La Regla de la Carga Pública

El 27 de enero de 2020, la Corte Suprema decidió suspender una orden judicial contra la “regla de la carga pública”. ¿Qué significa todo eso? Esencialmente, la Administración Trump creó una nueva regla que se habría aplicado a muchos inmigrantes en los Estados Unidos, particularmente a aquellos que buscan la residencia permanente. La norma se anunció el 14 de agosto de 2019 y estaba programada para entrar en vigencia el 15 de octubre de 2019. Antes de que eso pudiera suceder, varios tribunales federales de distrito emitieron lo que se denominan “injunctions” or mandatos contra la norma, evitando que entre en vigencia. Desde ese momento, la inmigración no ha podido comenzar a aplicar la regla.

La decisión de la Corte Suprema no es una decisión final sobre la regla en sí, que probablemente se abrirá paso a través del sistema judicial federal primero. Esta decisión solo está relacionada con una solicitud de “stay”, o suspención, que es esencialmente una orden judicial para detener temporalmente la acción de un tribunal inferior. Dicho de otra manera, la Corte Suprema anuló las decisiones de los tribunales inferiores, y dado que esas decisiones fueron todo lo que detuvo la nueva regla, esa regla probablemente entrará en vigencia pronto.

¿Por qué hizo esto la Corte Suprema? El Tribunal emitió una decisión explicando su razonamiento, pero no una decisión completa como se hace al final de un caso. Este tipo de decisiones rara vez implican una discusión exhaustiva de los problemas legales involucrados; más bien, se ocupan de si una regla entra en vigencia mientras es impugnada en los tribunales. Puede leer la decisión a continuación:

La decisión se tomó en una división de 5-4, lo que significa que fue muy divisiva. La única opinión refleja las crecientes preocupaciones sobre las órdenes judiciales que tienen un impacto a nivel nacional. Los cuatro jueces disidentes no escribieron para explicar su razonamiento, lo cual es típico. El juez Gorsuch escribió una opinión concurrente, unida por el juez Thomas, que arroja algo de luz sobre lo que al menos dos de los jueces estaban pensando. Un breve resumen de los puntos clave es:

  • El juez Gorsuch está claramente molesto por los jueces de los tribunales de distrito que impiden que el gobierno implemente una norma, aplicando ese alivio a todos sin importar dónde vivan o si fueron parte de la demanda en cuestión.
  • La decisión es el resultado del uso cada vez mayor de órdenes judiciales, que se deriva directamente del impulso de la Administración Trump para modificar el sistema de inmigración a través de las regulaciones en la mayor medida posible, a menudo empujando los límites de la ley y siempre creando litigios.
  • El juez Gorsuch parece creer que solo las partes en un caso deberían estar implicadas en un mandato de una regla como esta, y parece anhelar la oportunidad de frenar la práctica en general.

Estos son temas interesantes, y no hay duda de que los casos futuros podrían presentar una oportunidad para que la Corte Suprema reduzca la capacidad de los tribunales inferiores para emitir órdenes judiciales. Al mismo tiempo, la práctica de las órdenes judiciales parece derivarse directamente del aumento del uso de normas sustantivas por parte de varias administraciones, incluidas Trump y Obama, que también tienen un impacto nacional y afectan a millones de personas.

Hay una muy buena razón para evitar que el gobierno implemente una nueva regla controvertida mientras el tema se revisa en los tribunales: la regla podría ser inconstitucional. En la práctica, puede frustrar la capacidad de una administración para implementar su voluntad, como lo hizo evitar que Obama implemente su programa DAPA. Pero no hay nada que impida que los Tribunales de Apelaciones del Circuito emitan sus propias suspensiones, como sucedió aquí en varios casos, ni que la Corte Suprema lo interrumpa por su cuenta. El gobierno federal ciertamente está en una mejor posición para litigar estos asuntos que los millones de personas que de otro modo tendrían que demandar individualmente para obtener medidas cautelares individuales, como parece favorecer el juez Gorsuch. A pesar de sus preocupaciones, esto parece más eficiente que la alternativa que parece favorecer.

¿Cuál es el efecto práctico de esta decisión? Por el momento, nada ha cambiado. Pero es probable que USCIS anuncie una fecha para comenzar a implementar la regla, con todos sus cambios sustantivos, dentro de días o semanas. Eso es significativo Ese anuncio probablemente aparecerá en el sitio web de USCIS. Parece que la decisión no se extiende a la orden judicial que se aplica en el estado de Illinois, por el momento, pero dado que la regla aún no se ha implementado en ningún lado, es mejor esperar y ver cómo la inmigración lo interpreta con respecto al impacto geográfico.

¿Qué deberían hacer los abogados y los solicitantes ahora? Presente sus solicitudes. Si está esperando en enviar algún ajuste de estado que pueda verse afectado por esta regla, es probable que deba enviarse por correo inmediatamente. La implementación de la regla significará que se deben volver a hacer muchos formularios, se requerirán formularios y tarifas completamente nuevos, y algunas personas podrían incluso ser rechazadas en función de los motivos de la carga pública. Cualquier persona que todavía esté en el proceso de preparación de una solicitud debe reevaluar su elegibilidad, qué formularios es probable que requieran cambios y discutir esas cosas con un abogado.

BIA Decisión Sobre Prórrogas de Corte, Matter of Mayen

La Board of Immigration Appeals emitió una decisión el 22 de enero de 2020, titulada Matter of Mayen, 27 I&N Dec. 755. Esta decisión se produjo después de una apelación de un individuo al que se le negó la continuación en la corte de inmigración. La razón para solicitar la continuación fue dar tiempo para que el USCIS adjudique una Petición de Estatus de No Inmigrante U pendiente, generalmente llamada Visa U.

Esta decisión es importante porque la Administración Trump ha luchado para aumentar la velocidad a la que se deciden los casos en el tribunal de inmigración, y con ello el número de personas que pueden ser deportadas. Eso ha fracasado en gran medida ya que el número de casos en los tribunales se ha disparado más de un millón y muchos casos aún requieren años para procesarse. Reducir el número de continuidades otorgadas ha sido un gran objetivo.

Además, en virtud de una decisión anterior titulada Asunto de Sánchez Sosa, 25 I&N Dic. 807 (BIA 2012), que creó una especie de presunción de ejercer discreción para continuar un caso si hay una solicitud de Visa U pendiente siempre que se considere ” prima facie aprobable ”. Eso generalmente significaba que si era probable que fuera aprobado o el USCIS hubiera indicado que lo aprobaría, de no ser por falta de visas, el caso generalmente debería continuar.

La decisión en Materia de Mayen no anula esta importante decisión, pero confunde el problema lo suficiente como para que pueda dañar a las personas que intentan continuar los casos en función de las Visas U pendientes. Las personas en los procesos judiciales de inmigración probablemente escucharán muchos de los mismos factores citados en Materia de Mayen en los próximos meses y años, tales como:

  • La falta de diligencia en la obtención de una visa U, como esperar años después de que se cometió un delito para presentar, contará contra las continuidades
  • Incertidumbre sobre cuándo se puede emitir una visa, una preocupación real cuando los tiempos de espera pueden ser más de una década
  • La oposición del DHS a las continuidades, que ahora son generalmente ciertas
  • Un estado individual como detenido bajo un peso a favor de casos rápidos
  • La naturaleza especulativa e indefinida de las solicitudes de continuidad
  • Negar una continuación no es realmente el caso del prejuicio individual

¿Cómo podrían responder los individuos a estos problemas en sus propios casos? Lo más probable es que sus abogados tengan que hacer frente a la carga cada vez mayor de probar cada elemento de cada caso, como está ocurriendo en muchas áreas de la ley de inmigración. Algunas posibles reacciones a esta nueva decisión pueden incluir:

  • Documentar afirmativamente las razones por las cuales alguien no fue diligente en la presentación de una visa U cuando se cometió un delito, como no conocer la visa U como una forma de alivio o por otras razones
  • Explicar por qué ser detenido no siempre es contrario al interés de un individuo, especialmente si temen persecución, tortura y muerte en otro país.
  • El alivio de la visa U no siempre es especulativo si es una muestra prima facie
  • La naturaleza indefinida de las solicitudes de continuación se debe en realidad al hecho de que el gobierno eliminó la capacidad de los jueces de inmigración para cerrar casos administrativamente o de otro modo gestionar casos que podrían estar pendientes durante años
  • Negar una continuación da como resultado un prejuicio real porque el USCIS generalmente emite avisos de acción diferida y permisos de trabajo para aquellos con casos aprobables, y la demora en hacerlo es completamente del lado del USCIS

USCIS Comienza a Aceptar Solicitudes de Residencia para Ciertos Liberianos

El 26 de diciembre de 2019, el USCIS anunció que había comenzado a aceptar la solicitud de ajuste de estatus según la nueva ley aprobada el 20 de diciembre. También proporcionó información sobre quién es elegible o no elegible para el programa. Si bien esta nueva ley solo se aplica a los liberianos y sus familias, contiene algunas disposiciones muy generosas que podrían extenderse a las familias no liberianas e incluso a los hijos adultos. Programe una consulta hoy para obtener más información.

Lea el anuncio completo a continuación:

Today, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services announced that it will begin accepting applications to adjust status to lawful permanent resident from certain Liberian nationals under Section 7611 of the National Defense Authorization Act (PDF) for fiscal year 2020, Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness (LRIF), signed into law on Dec. 20, 2019.

To be eligible for permanent residence (a Green Card) under LRIF, a Liberian national must have been continuously physically present in the United States from Nov. 20, 2014, to the date they properly file an application for adjustment of status. USCIS will accept properly filed applications until Dec. 20, 2020, one year from the enactment of the LRIF.

Applicants must be otherwise eligible to receive an immigrant visa and be admissible to the United States. The spouses, unmarried children under 21, and unmarried sons and daughters 21 or older of eligible Liberian nationals are also eligible for Green Cards.

The following grounds of inadmissibility do not apply to applicants under the LRIF:
– Public Charge (INA 212(a)(4));
– Labor Certification Requirements (INA 212(a)(5));
– Aliens Present Without Admission or Parole (INA 212(a)(6)(A)); and
– Documentation Requirements (INA 212(a)(7)(A).

Aliens are ineligible under LRIF if they have:

– Been convicted of any aggravated felony;
– Been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense); or
– Ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.

For more information about filing for adjustment of status under the LRIF, see the LRIF page on the USCIS website and for Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status.

Formulario I-601A Nuevo de USCIS

Form I-601A

El USCIS anunció el 10 de diciembre de 2019 que estaba actualizando dos formularios. Esta actualización incluye el formulario I-601A de uso frecuente, utilizado para solicitar exenciones provisionales de presencia ilegal. El nuevo formulario I-601A solo se aceptará después del 10 de febrero de 2020. Consulte la página del formulario para obtener más información.

Nueva decisión del BIA en Matter of Y-I-M-

Blank Form

El BIA publicó una nueva decisión el 12 de diciembre de 2019. Matter of Y-I-M-, 27 I&N Dic. 724 (BIA 2019), analiza los hallazgos de credibilidad adversa en el contexto de una solicitud de asilo en los procedimientos de expulsión. La BIA sostuvo que (traducción no oficial):

(1) Un Juez de Inmigración puede confiar en inconsistencias para respaldar un hallazgo de credibilidad adverso siempre que el Juez de Inmigración, el solicitante o el Departamento de Seguridad Nacional hayan identificado las discrepancias y el solicitante haya tenido la oportunidad de explicarlas durante el escuchando.

(2) Un juez de inmigración puede, pero no está obligado a, identificar personalmente una inconsistencia obvia cuando sea razonable suponer que el solicitante estaba al tanto de ello y tuvo la oportunidad de ofrecer una explicación antes de que el juez de inmigración lo confiara.

En esencia, esta decisión hace que sea más fácil para un juez de inmigración encontrar, y el BIA para defender, decisiones de credibilidad adversas. La BIA se negó a adoptar requisitos más estrictos para lo que debe hacer un juez antes de determinar que un solicitante de asilo no ha sido creíble.

Lea la decisión completa aquí.

USCIS Amplía los Actos Ilegales para la Naturalización

El USCIS anunció cambios en los actos que se consideran “ilegales” con el fin de determinar el “buen carácter moral”. Este es un cambio importante que afecta a varios tipos diferentes de beneficios, incluidas las solicitudes de naturalización para las personas que solicitan la ciudadanía estadounidense. Cualquier persona que crea que alguna vez tuvo problemas con alguno de los nuevos actos ilegales debe buscar asesoría legal antes de solicitar la naturalización.

Lea el anuncio completo a continuación:

WASHINGTON— Today, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services expanded its policy guidance regarding unlawful acts that may prevent an applicant from meeting the good moral character (GMC) requirement for naturalization. The commission of, or conviction or imprisonment for, an unlawful act, during the statutory period for naturalization, may render an applicant ineligible for naturalization should the act be found to adversely reflect on moral character.  

Previously, the USCIS Policy Manual did not include extensive information on unlawful acts. This update to the Policy Manual provides additional examples of unlawful acts and instructions to ensure USCIS adjudicators make uniform and fair determinations, and further identifies unlawful acts that may affect GMC based on judicial precedent. This update does not change the impact of an unlawful act on USCIS’ analysis of whether an applicant can demonstrate GMC. Adjudicators in the field receive extensive training to apply the law on GMC and unlawful acts regulation. They are aware of which unlawful acts could bar an applicant from naturalization and are not limited by the examples listed in the Policy Manual.

On Dec. 10, USCIS issued separate policy guidance in the USCIS Policy Manual about how two or more convictions for driving under the influence or post-sentencing changes to criminal sentencing might affect GMC determinations.

“In the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress determined that good moral character is a requirement for naturalization,” said USCIS Deputy Director Mark Koumans. “USCIS is committed to faithfully administering our nation’s lawful immigration system, and this update helps to ensure that our agency’s adjudicators make uniform and fair decisions concerning the consideration of unlawful acts on good moral character when determining eligibility for U.S. citizenship.”

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), an applicant for naturalization must establish GMC. Although the INA does not directly define GMC, it does describe certain acts that bar establishing GMC of an applicant. Examples of unlawful acts recognized by case law as barring GMC include, but are not limited to, the following:

bail jumping;

bank fraud;

conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance;

failure to file or pay taxes;

false claim to U.S. citizenship;

falsification of records;

forgery uttering;

insurance fraud;

obstruction of justice;

sexual assault;

Social Security fraud;

unlawful harassment;

unlawful registration to vote;

unlawful voting; and

violation of a U.S. embargo.

In general, applicants must show they have been, and continue to be, people of GMC during the statutory period before filing for naturalization and up until they take the Oath of Allegiance. The statutory period is generally five years for permanent residents of the United States, three years for applicants married to a U.S. citizen, and one year for certain applicants applying on the basis of qualifying U.S. military service.

USCIS officers must continue to perform a case-by-case analysis to determine whether an act is unlawful and adversely reflects on an applicant’s good moral character. They must also determine whether there are extenuating circumstances. An extenuating circumstance must pertain to the unlawful act and must precede or be contemporaneous with the commission of the unlawful act. Training for adjudicators will be updated to reflect this expanded guidance.

Anuncio de USCIS sobre viajes con TPS

El USCIS anunció cambios en su manual de políticas el 20 de diciembre de 2019, en relación con los beneficiarios del Estatus de Protección Temporal (TPS) que viajan fuera de los Estados Unidos. TPS es un tipo especial de estado migratorio que se rige por diferentes reglas de acuerdo con la ley. Algunos destinatarios de TPS se encontraban en proceso de expulsión y algunos incluso recibieron la orden de retirarlo antes de obtener la aprobación de TPS. Sin embargo, muchos con TPS pueden viajar con aprobación previa de libertad condicional y regresar a los EE. UU. Esto crea circunstancias especiales porque viajar con una orden de expulsión pendiente generalmente ejecuta esa orden, evitando que uno regrese a los EE. UU. También crea problemas jurisdiccionales poco comunes al determinar si una persona más tarde solicitaría un ajuste de estatus (una tarjeta verde) en la corte o ante el USCIS. El anuncio de hoy aclara la posición de USCIS sobre esos temas.

Puede leer el anuncio completo abajo:

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services is updating the USCIS Policy Manual to clarify the effect of travel outside the United States by Temporary Protected Status (TPS) beneficiaries who are subject to removal proceedings.

In particular, this update covers beneficiaries who have final removal orders, and who depart the United States and return with an advance parole travel document. TPS beneficiaries in removal proceedings who travel abroad temporarily with the authorization of DHS remain subject to those removal proceedings. If they are under a final order of removal, the travel does not execute or fulfill the order. The alien in question remains subject to the removal order.   

The Executive Office for Immigration Review of the Department of Justice will generally have jurisdiction over an adjustment of status application filed by a TPS beneficiary subject to removal proceedings. USCIS continues to have jurisdiction over requests from aliens initially paroled into the United States. By statute, upon return to the United States with TPS travel authorization, TPS beneficiaries retain the same immigration status they held before departing the United States.