USCIS Updates Many Forms to Implement Public Charge Rule

Stacks of Papers

Following the announcement that USCIS would begin implementation of the public charge rule on February 24, 2020, it has now released the new forms that will be required. In addition, it is introducing three entirely new forms that deal with specific requirements under the new rule.

According to USCIS, the new forms will be accepted so long as they are post-marked February 24, 2020 or before. That means that it should not be the date the forms are received or processed, giving applicants a few extra days. But applicants are encouraged to send any of the below forms which have already been prepared, if possible. Not only will the new rules apply to most cases, but also the new forms will be required even if the new rules don’t apply.

Finally, applicants in Illinois are not yet bound by the new rule, however that could change before the effective date. USCIS has established a special web page just to address questions regarding applicants living in Illinois. You can view that web site here: https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/public-charge-inadmissibility-determinations-illinois

The new forms include:

The revised forms include:

Review the full announcement here: https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/public-charge-inadmissibility-final-rule-revised-forms-and-updated-policy-manual-guidance

Is It Too Late to Apply For Citizenship and Vote in the 2020 Presidential Election?

US Citizenship

Time is running out to complete the naturalization process in the United States in time to vote in the 2020 Presidential Election. Applying for naturalization, the process of becoming a US Citizen, is a time consuming process that generally involves four main steps:

  1. Submitting the form N-400, Application for Naturalization
  2. Attending a biometrics appointment to take fingerprints and a picture
  3. Passing an interview and exam at a local USCIS Office
  4. Attending a citizenship ceremony.

The reason this process is slow is almost entirely due to government delays in processing paperwork. The actual delay depends on the field office that is processing the application, as each office has different workloads, staff levels, and local practices. Statistics are available in general from USCIS’s website for case processing times. To use that tool, choose the form number N-400 and then the local field office with jurisdiction over the area where you reside. However, these statistics are more like averages and tend to overestimate the processing time for a simple case.

That being said, some cases take longer. Some people have to undergo longer background checks and security clearances. Some people are interviewed twice, for example if they don’t pass their first interview. And finally, there may be a delay before the citizenship ceremony is scheduled, sometimes several months. That last step is key, because the process is not complete and the person is not officially a citizen until they have received their certificate at a ceremony.

A final consideration is that every potential voter must first become a citizen and then register to vote. Each state has laws on when and how voters must register. Those deadlines can be reviewed at websites like vote.org. Some new citizens may not be aware of this requirement and will be disappointed if they aren’t able to vote after all.

Is it already too late to naturalize in order to vote in the 2020 election? Not necessarily, but it may be for some people. Those interested in voting should make an effort to file as soon as possible.

Changes to Processing of I-130 Family Petitions Abroad

Paperwork

The I-130 family petition is normally filed within the United States at a centralized office. In certain circumstances, the petition may be filed directly abroad. This process is becoming more difficult as USCIS moves to close many of its international offices. USCIS just announced that it delegated some of its authority to process the family petitions to the Department of State. That change was effective February 1, 2020.

Most likely, the embassies and consulates processing these petitions are going to be slower than USCIS offices abroad, which often reached decisions much more quickly than USCIS in the states. Read the full announcement below.

WASHINGTON — U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services today announced that, as part of the adjustment of its international footprint to increase efficiencies, Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, will only be processed domestically by USCIS or internationally by the Department of State in certain circumstances beginning Feb 1, 2020.  

DOS will assume responsibility for certain services previously provided at USCIS international offices, services that DOS already provide in countries where USCIS does not have a presence. Eligible active-duty service members assigned overseas will file their Form I-130 locally with DOS, as will certain non-military petitioners who meet specific criteria for consular processing.  

“USCIS continues to modernize and become more efficient as an agency,” said USCIS Deputy Director Mark Koumans. “Since the Department of State has a much larger international presence, we have delegated authority to our State partners to accept and adjudicate petitions for immediate relatives abroad in certain circumstances. USCIS continues to expand online filing options, which are available to those filing domestically or those filing from abroad, saving applicants and petitioners time and money.” 

Generally, DOS will process Form I-130 locally if the petition falls under blanket authorization criteria, as defined by USCIS:

Temporary blanket authorizations for instances of prolonged or severe civil strife or a natural disaster; or  

Blanket authorization for U.S. service members assigned to military bases abroad. 

In addition to these blanket authorizations, DOS maintains the discretion to accept Form I-130 if a U.S. citizen petitioner meets the “exceptional circumstance” criteria as outlined in the Policy Manual update. 

All other petitioners residing overseas must file Form I-130 online or by mail through the USCIS Dallas Lockbox facility for domestic processing.  

https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscis-updates-process-accepting-petitions-relatives-abroad

New Travel Ban Issued to Include Six Additional Countries

Locked Door

On January 31st, 2020, President Donald Trump announced issued an executive order banning nationals of certain countries from certain types of travel to the United States. This travel ban follows a similar one which targeted Muslim-majority countries back in 2017, and which was upheld by the Supreme Court as constitutional.

Some of the notable features of this ban are:

  • It affects nationals of six countries: Burma (Myanmar), Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tanzania
  • The ban is not a complete ban, and it affects each country somewhat differently
  • It is possible that some countries will react and will be removed from the list, as has happened in past travel bans
  • The travel bans for Burma (Myanmar), Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, and Nigeria only apply to immigrants meaning that they should not apply to temporary travelers on nonimmigrant visas
  • The travel bans for Tanzania and Sudan apply to diversity immigrants meaning those who are applying for green cards under the diversity visa program, and not other travelers
  • The effective date and time is 12:01 am eastern standard time on February 21, 2020
  • The reason for the ban is ostensibly that the US Government is unsatisfied with the cooperation of those governments in sharing information and assisting in national security matters
  • Waivers may still be available for individuals from these countries even if the ban applies

Read the full order below:

In Executive Order 13780 of March 6, 2017 (Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States), I temporarily suspended entry of nationals of certain specified countries and ordered a worldwide review of whether the United States would need additional information from each foreign country to assess adequately whether nationals of that foreign country seeking to enter the United States pose a security or public-safety threat to the United States, and if so, what additional information was needed.  The Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to Executive Order 13780 and in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, developed an assessment model using three categories of criteria to assess national security and public-safety threats:  whether a foreign government engages in reliable identity-management practices and shares relevant information; whether a foreign government shares national security and public-safety information; and whether a country otherwise poses a national security or public-safety risk.

Following a comprehensive worldwide review of the performance of approximately 200 countries using these criteria, the Secretary of Homeland Security presented the results of this review, focusing in particular on those countries that were deficient or at risk of becoming deficient in their performance under the assessment criteria.  After a subsequent period of diplomatic engagement on these issues by the Department of State, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security submitted a report in September 2017, which found that eight countries were hindering the ability of the United States Government to identify threats posed by foreign nationals attempting to enter the United States.  The Secretary of Homeland Security then recommended that I impose travel restrictions on certain nationals of those countries.  After consultation with relevant Cabinet officials and appropriate Assistants to the President, I issued Proclamation 9645 of September 24, 2017 (Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats).

In Proclamation 9645, I suspended and limited the entry into the United States of certain nationals of eight countries that failed to satisfy the criteria and were unable or unwilling to improve their information sharing, or that otherwise presented serious terrorism-related risks.  Those travel restrictions remain in effect today, with one exception.  On April 10, 2018, I issued Proclamation 9723 (Maintaining Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats), removing travel restrictions on nationals of the Republic of Chad.  Chad had improved its identity-management and information-sharing practices by taking steps to issue more secure passports and by increasing the integrity of how its government handles lost and stolen passports.  Chad also began to share information about known or suspected terrorists in a manner that makes that information available to the United States screening and vetting programs, and it created a new, standardized process for the United States to request relevant criminal information.

Pursuant to my directives in section 4 of Proclamation 9645, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has continued to assess every 180 days and report to me on whether the interests of the United States require the suspension of or limitation on entry of certain classes of foreign nationals.  DHS has also continued to assess ways to further improve its processes for measuring how countries perform under the assessment criteria.  From July 2018 through August 2019, DHS updated its methodology to assess compliance with the assessment criteria, which has allowed for more in-depth analysis and yields even more granularity and increased accuracy regarding each country’s performance under the criteria.

In this updated methodology, the general overall criteria for review have not changed.  The United States Government still expects all foreign governments to share needed identity-management information, to share national security and public-safety information, and to pass a security and public-safety risk assessment.  Building on experience and insight gained over the last 2 years, DHS has, however, refined and modified the specific performance metrics by which it assesses compliance with the above criteria.  For example, while the prior model determined whether a country shares certain needed information, the revised model accounts for how frequently the country shares that information and the extent to which that data contributes to border and immigration screening and vetting.  As another example, the prior system asked whether a country issued electronic passports at all, whereas the refined metrics assess whether a country issues electronic passports for all major classes of travel documents.  Similarly, the lost and stolen passports criterion previously assessed whether a country had prior instances of reporting loss or theft to the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), whereas the revised model now assesses whether the country has reported lost or stolen passports to INTERPOL within 30 days of a report of a loss or theft.

The DHS improvements to the assessment criteria also involve additional, and more customized, data from the United States Intelligence Community.  DHS’s original evaluation under Executive Order 13780 relied on existing intelligence products to assess the threat from each country.  With the benefit of 2 years of experience, DHS has worked closely with the Intelligence Community to define intelligence requirements and customize intelligence reporting that offers a detailed characterization of the relative risk of terrorist travel to the United States from each country in the world.  This additional detail improves DHS’s assessment of national security and public-safety risk.

In addition, DHS greatly increased the amount of information obtained from United States Embassies abroad, which work closely with foreign governments.  United States Embassies are best positioned to understand their host countries’ ability and willingness to provide information to the United States, and United States Embassies’ assessments contribute to a clearer understanding of how well a foreign government satisfies the assessment criteria.  DHS also consolidated statistical information on operational encounters with foreign nationals.  This information speaks to the frequency with which a country’s nationals commit offenses while in the United States or otherwise develop grounds for inadmissibility under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

Finally, as more precise, granular data became available, it became clear that many countries were only partially implementing each criterion.  The 2017 process had three basic potential compliance ratings for each criterion:  in compliance, out of compliance, or unknown.  The updated methodology allows the United States to account for ways in which countries partially comply with the metrics associated with each criterion.  As a result, for example, countries that DHS assessed in the 2017 review have now received more nuanced, partial compliance ratings.  In addition, the process now weighs each criterion and risk factor based on its degree of importance to the United States Government for conducting screening and vetting of visa applicants and other travelers to the United States.

Using this enhanced review process, DHS conducted its most recent, worldwide review pursuant to Proclamation 9645 between March 2019 and September 2019.  The process began on March 11, 2019, when the United States Government formally notified all foreign governments (except for Iran, Syria, and North Korea) about the refined performance metrics for the identity-management and information-sharing criteria.  After collecting information from foreign governments, multilateral organizations, United States Embassies, Federal law enforcement agencies, and the Intelligence Community, multiple subject matter experts reviewed each country’s data and measured its identity-management and information-sharing practices against the criteria.  DHS then applied the data to an algorithm it developed to consistently assess each country’s compliance with the criteria.

DHS identified the worst-performing countries for further interagency review and for an assessment of the potential impact of visa restrictions.  As in the worldwide review culminating in Proclamation 9645, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security assessed that Iraq did not meet the baseline for compliance.  As part of the interagency review process, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security determined, however, not to recommend entry restrictions and limitations for nationals of Iraq.  In his report, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security recognized a close cooperative relationship between the United States and the democratically elected government of Iraq, the strong United States diplomatic presence in Iraq, the significant presence of United States forces in Iraq, and Iraq’s commitment to combating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  The Acting Secretary of Homeland Security considered another similarly situated country and determined that, for reasons similar to those present in Iraq, entry restrictions and limitations would not be appropriate.

In addition, the United States Government, led by the Department of State, continued or increased engagements with many countries about those countries’ deficiencies.  A number of foreign governments sent senior officials to Washington, D.C., to discuss those issues, explore potential solutions, and convey views about obstacles to improving performance.  As a result of this engagement, one country made sufficient improvements in its information-sharing and identity-management practices and was removed from consideration for travel restrictions.

On September 13, 2019, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, after consulting with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other appropriate agencies, submitted a fourth report to me recommending the suspension of, or limitation on, the entry of certain classes of nationals from certain countries in order to protect United States national security, including by incentivizing those foreign governments to improve their practices.  The Acting Secretary of Homeland Security recommended maintaining the current restrictions on the seven countries announced in Proclamation 9645 (apart from Chad), as well as implementing suspensions and limitations on entry for certain nationals of twelve additional countries.

Since the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security issued his report on September 13, 2019, the Secretary of State, consistent with section 4(b) of Proclamation 9645, has continued to engage many foreign governments regarding the deficiencies identified in DHS’s report and has continued to consult with the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, and other Cabinet-level officials about how best to protect the national interest.  Based on these engagements, in January 2020, those senior officials recommended that I maintain the entry restrictions adopted in Proclamation 9645 (as modified by Proclamation 9723), and that I exercise my authority under section 212(f) of the INA to suspend entry into the United States for nationals of six new countries — Burma (Myanmar), Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tanzania — until those countries address their identified deficiencies.

The January 2020 proposal recommended visa restrictions on fewer countries than identified by the September 2019 DHS report.  For example, the January 2020 proposal recommended no entry restrictions on nationals of one country that had been recommended for restrictions in the September 2019 report.  This country made exceptional progress in correcting deficiencies since the September 2019 report, such that it could no longer be characterized as a country that is among those posing the highest degree of risk.  In addition, the January 2020 proposal recommended that, for five poorly performing countries, foreign policy interests warranted a different approach than recommended in the September 2019 report.  Specifically, the January 2020 proposal suggested that diplomatic engagement and requests for specific improvements during a defined 180-day period would be more appropriate and more likely to result in immediate improvements in these five countries.  Each of these five countries provides critical counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and therefore holds strategic importance in countering malign external actors.  In several of the five countries, the United States has experienced a recent deepening of diplomatic ties that generally mark increased cooperation toward achieving key regional and global United States foreign policy goals.  Importantly, all five countries have credibly communicated willingness to work directly with the United States Government to correct their outstanding deficiencies, and the United States believes progress is imminent for several countries and underway for others.  For these reasons, these countries will be given an opportunity to show specific improvements in their deficiencies within the next 180 days.

Consistent with recommendations contained in the January 2020 proposal, I have decided to leave unaltered the existing entry restrictions imposed by Proclamation 9645, as amended by Proclamation 9723, and to impose tailored entry restrictions and limitations on nationals from six additional countries.  I have decided not to impose any nonimmigrant visa restrictions for the newly identified countries, which substantially reduces the number of people affected by the proposed restrictions.  Like the seven countries that continue to face travel restrictions pursuant to Proclamation 9645, the six additional countries recommended for restrictions in the January 2020 proposal are among the worst performing in the world.  However, there are prospects for near-term improvement for these six countries.  Each has a functioning government and each maintains productive relations with the United States.  Most of the newly identified countries have expressed a willingness to work with the United States to address their deficiencies, although it may take some time to identify and implement specific solutions to resolve the deficiencies.

Consistent with the January 2020 proposal, I have prioritized restricting immigrant visa travel over nonimmigrant visa travel because of the challenges of removing an individual in the United States who was admitted with an immigrant visa if, after admission to the United States, the individual is discovered to have terrorist connections, criminal ties, or misrepresented information.  Because each of the six additional countries identified in the January 2020 proposal has deficiencies in sharing terrorist, criminal, or identity information, there is an unacceptable likelihood that information reflecting the fact that a visa applicant is a threat to national security or public safety may not be available at the time the visa or entry is approved.

For two newly identified countries that were among the highest risk countries, but performed somewhat better than others, I have decided, consistent with the January 2020 proposal, to suspend entry only of Diversity Immigrants, as described in section 203(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1153(c).  Such a suspension represents a less severe limit compared to a general restriction on immigrant visas, given the significantly fewer number of aliens affected.  The Acting Secretary of Homeland Security considers foreign-government-supplied information especially important for screening and vetting the Diversity Visa population in comparison to other immigrant visa applicants, and I agree with that assessment.  In many cases, the United States Government may not have the same amount of information about Diversity Visa applicants compared with other categories of immigrant visa applicants because Diversity Visa applicants, with limited exceptions, do not have the burden to show certain family ties to or employment in the United States, or particular service to the United States Government, as required for other immigrant visa categories.

Consistent with the January 2020 proposal, I have decided not to impose any restrictions on certain Special Immigrant Visas for nationals of the six newly identified countries.  Applicants under Special Immigrant programs generally do not need to demonstrate the same work or familial ties as other immigrant visas, but do need to show other unique qualifications.  This exception is intended to cover those Special Immigrants who have advanced United States interests (and their eligible family members), such as foreign nationals who have worked for a United States Embassy for 15 years or more and are especially deserving of a visa.

As President, I must continue to act to protect the security and interests of the United States and its people.  I remain committed to our ongoing efforts to engage those countries willing to cooperate, to improve information-sharing and identity-management protocols and procedures, and to address both terrorism-related and public-safety risks.  And I believe that the assessment process, including enhancements made to that process, leads to new partnerships that strengthen our immigration screening and vetting capabilities.  Until the countries identified in this proclamation satisfactorily address the identified deficiencies, I have determined, on the basis of a recommendation from the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security and other members of my Cabinet, to impose certain conditional restrictions and limitations on entry into the United States of nationals of the countries identified in section 1 of this proclamation, as set forth more fully below.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, hereby find that, absent the measures set forth in this proclamation, the immigrant entry into the United States of persons described in section 1 of this proclamation would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and that their entry should be subject to certain restrictions, limitations, and exceptions.  I therefore hereby proclaim the following:

    Section 1.  Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Identified Concern.   The entry into the United States of nationals of the following countries is hereby suspended and limited, as follows, subject to section 2 of this proclamation.

(a)  The entry suspensions and limitations enacted by section 2 of Proclamation 9645 are not altered by this proclamation, and they remain in force by their terms, except as modified by Proclamation 9723.

(b)  Burma (Myanmar)

(i)  Although Burma has begun to engage with the United States on a variety of identity-management and information-sharing issues, it does not comply with the established identity-management and information-sharing criteria assessed by the performance metrics.  Burma does not issue electronic passports nor does it adequately share several types of information, including public-safety and terrorism-related information, that are necessary for the protection of the national security and public safety of the United States.  Burma is in the process of modernizing its domestic identity-management and criminal-records systems and has worked with the United States to develop some of those systems.  It has also recognized the need to make improvements.  As its capabilities improve, the prospect for further bilateral cooperation will likely also increase.  Despite these encouraging prospects, Burma’s identified deficiencies create vulnerabilities that terrorists, criminals, and fraudulent entrants could exploit to harm United States national security and public safety.

(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Burma as immigrants, except as Special Immigrants whose eligibility is based on having provided assistance to the United States Government, is hereby suspended.

(c)  Eritrea

(i)  Eritrea does not comply with the established identity-management and information-sharing criteria assessed by the performance metrics.  Eritrea does not issue electronic passports or adequately share several types of information, including public-safety and terrorism-related information, that are necessary for the protection of the national security and public safety of the United States.  Further, Eritrea is currently subject to several nonimmigrant visa restrictions.  Eritrea does not accept return of its nationals subject to final orders of removal from the United States, which further magnifies the challenges of removing its nationals who have entered with immigrant visas.  Eritrea has engaged with the United States about its deficiencies, but it also requires significant reforms to its border security, travel-document security, and information-sharing infrastructure.  Improvements in these areas will increase its opportunities to come into compliance with the United States Government’s identity-management and information-sharing criteria.

(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Eritrea as immigrants, except as Special Immigrants whose eligibility is based on having provided assistance to the United States Government, is hereby suspended.

(d)  Kyrgyzstan

(i)  Kyrgyzstan does not comply with the established identity-management and information-sharing criteria assessed by the performance metrics.  Kyrgyzstan does not issue electronic passports or adequately share several types of information, including public-safety and terrorism-related information, that are necessary for the protection of the national security and public safety of the United States.  Kyrgyzstan also presents an elevated risk, relative to other countries in the world, of terrorist travel to the United States, though it has been responsive to United States diplomatic engagement on the need to make improvements.

(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Kyrgyzstan as immigrants, except as Special Immigrants whose eligibility is based on having provided assistance to the United States Government, is hereby suspended.

(e)  Nigeria

(i)  Nigeria does not comply with the established identity-management and information-sharing criteria assessed by the performance metrics.  Nigeria does not adequately share public-safety and terrorism-related information, which is necessary for the protection of the national security and public safety of the United States.  Nigeria also presents a high risk, relative to other countries in the world, of terrorist travel to the United States.  Nigeria is an important strategic partner in the global fight against terrorism, and the United States continues to engage with Nigeria on these and other issues.  The Department of State has provided significant assistance to Nigeria as it modernizes its border management capabilities, and the Government of Nigeria recognizes the importance of improving its information sharing with the United States.  Nevertheless, these investments have not yet resulted in sufficient improvements in Nigeria’s information sharing with the United States for border and immigration screening and vetting.

(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Nigeria as immigrants, except as Special Immigrants whose eligibility is based on having provided assistance to the United States Government, is hereby suspended.

(f)  Sudan

(i)  Sudan generally does not comply with our identity-management performance metrics and presents a high risk, relative to other countries in the world, of terrorist travel to the United States.  Sudan is, however, transitioning to civilian rule, a process which should improve opportunities for cooperation in the future, and it has already made progress in addressing its deficiencies in several areas.  For example, Sudan now issues electronic passports and has improved its coordination with INTERPOL in several respects.  Sudan has also shared exemplars of its passports with the United States and now permanently invalidates lost and stolen passports and fraudulently obtained travel documents.  Because Sudan performed somewhat better than the countries listed earlier in this proclamation and is making important reforms to its system of government, different travel restrictions are warranted.

(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Sudan as Diversity Immigrants, as described in section 203(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1153(c), is hereby suspended.

(g)  Tanzania

(i)  Tanzania does not comply with the established identity-management and information-sharing criteria assessed by the performance metrics.  Tanzania does not adequately share several types of information, including public-safety and terrorism-related information, that is necessary for the protection of the national security and public safety of the United States.  The Government of Tanzania’s significant failures to adequately share information with the United States and other countries about possible Ebola cases in its territory detract from my confidence in its ability to resolve these deficiencies.  Tanzania also presents an elevated risk, relative to other countries in the world, of terrorist travel to the United States.  Tanzania does, however, issue electronic passports for all major passport classes, reports lost and stolen travel documents to INTERPOL at least once a month, and has provided exemplars of its current passports to the United States.  Further, Tanzania does share some information with the United States, although its processes can be slow, overly bureaucratic, and complicated by limited technical capability.  In light of these considerations, different travel restrictions are warranted.

(ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Tanzania as Diversity Immigrants, as described in section 203(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1153(c), is hereby suspended.

Sec. 2.  Scope and Implementation of Suspensions and Limitations.   (a)  Subject to the exceptions set forth in section 3(b) of Proclamation 9645, any waiver under section 3(c) of Proclamation 9645, and any enforcement provision of section 6(b) through (e) of Proclamation 9645, the suspensions of and limitations on entry pursuant to section 1(b) of this proclamation shall apply to foreign nationals of the designated countries who:

(i)    are outside the United States on the applicable effective date of this proclamation;

(ii)   do not have a valid visa on the applicable
effective date of this proclamation; and

(iii)  do not qualify for a visa or other valid travel document under section 6(d) of Proclamation 9645.

(b)  The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall coordinate to update guidance, if necessary, to implement this proclamation as to nationals of the six countries identified in section 1(b) of this proclamation, consistent with the provisions of this section.

(c)  For purposes of this proclamation, the phrase “Special Immigrants whose eligibility is based on having provided assistance to the United States Government” means those aliens described in section 101(a)(27)(D) through (G) and (K) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(D) through (G) and (K), any alien seeking to enter the United States pursuant to a Special Immigrant Visa in the SI or SQ classification, and any spouse and children of any such individual.

Sec. 3.  Reporting Requirements.    (a)  Section 4 of Proclamation 9645 is amended to read as follows:

“Sec. 4.  Adjustments to Removal of Suspensions and Limitations.

“(a)  The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall on October 1, 2020, and annually thereafter, submit to the President the results of an evaluation as to whether to continue, terminate, modify, or supplement any suspensions of, or limitations on, the entry on certain classes of nationals of countries identified in section 2 of this proclamation and section 1(b) of the Proclamation “Improving Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats,” signed on January 31, 2020.

“(b)  The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall not less than every 2 years evaluate whether each country in the world sufficiently shares relevant information and maintains adequate identity-management and information-sharing practices to mitigate the risk that its citizens or residents may travel to the United States in furtherance of criminal or terrorist objectives, or otherwise seek to violate any law of the United States through travel or immigration.  In doing so, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall:

“(i)   in consultation with the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence, report to the President, through the appropriate Assistants to the President, any instance in which, based on a review conducted under subsection (b) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security believes it is in the interests of the United States to suspend or limit the entry of certain classes of nationals of a country; and

“(ii)  in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, regularly review and update as necessary the criteria and methodology by which such evaluations are implemented to ensure they continue to protect the national interests of the United States.

“(c)  Notwithstanding the requirements set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence, may, at any time, recommend that the President impose, modify, or terminate a suspension or limitation on entry on certain classes of foreign nationals to protect the national interests of the United States.”

(b)  Section 5 of Proclamation 9645 is revoked.

Sec. 4.  Effective Date.   This proclamation is effective at 12:01 am eastern standard time on February 21, 2020.  With respect to the application of those provisions of Proclamation 9645 that are incorporated here through section 2 for countries designated in section 1(b), and that contained their own effective dates, those dates are correspondingly updated to be January 31, 2020, or February 21, 2020, as appropriate.

Sec. 5.  Severability.    It is the policy of the United States to enforce this proclamation to the maximum extent possible to advance the national security, foreign policy, and counterterrorism interests of the United States.  Accordingly:

(a)  if any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this proclamation and the application of its other provisions to any other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby; and

(b)  if any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid because of the lack of certain procedural requirements, the relevant executive branch officials shall implement those procedural requirements to conform with existing law and with any applicable court orders.

Sec. 6.  General Provisions.   (a)  Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i)    United States Government obligations under applicable international agreements;

(ii)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(iii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b)  This proclamation shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c)  This proclamation is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this thirty-first day of January, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-fourth.

DONALD J. TRUMP

https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-improving-enhanced-vetting-capabilities-processes-detecting-attempted-entry/

BIA Decision on In-Absentia Orders for MPP Cases, Matter of J.J. Rodriguez

On January 31, 2020, the BIA issued a decision in Matter of J.J. Rodriguez, 27 I&N Dec. 762. The case concerns proceedings under the Migrant Protection Protocols, or MPP, which force asylum seekers to wait for court hearings under dangerous conditions in Mexico. Under these proceedings, asylum seekers are given court dates in the United States, such as in San Diego, and then taken back to wait in Mexico. They are supposed to present themselves at the border on that date, at which point they will be allowed to enter for the hearing.

The Immigration Judge in Matter of J.J. Rodriguez, evidently concerned with this arrangement being a deprivation of the individual’s due process rights, declined to enter an in-absentia order when the individual did not arrive for the court hearing. The Department of Homeland Security attorneys appealed this decision, and the Board of Immigration Appeals agreed. The practical impact of this decision may be limited, since most likely judges have already been entering in-absentia orders when people fail to appear in cases under the MPP. However, it is another reminder of the continual erosion of due process and the complete lack of concern that the immigration court system has for the individuals unlucky enough to be caught up in it.

Read the full decision here:

USCIS Announces Implementation of Public Charge Rule

Following the Supreme Court’s stay of an injunction, USCIS has again begun the process of implementing its public charge rule. This rule will have widespread effects on most applications for permanent residency, also known as green cards. USCIS previously attempted to implement the rule, but it was enjoined by numerous federal courts and prevented from doing so. For the moment, it appears that the rule will go into effect on February 24, 2020, and it will not be going into effect in the state of Illinois where there is still an injunction. That may change in the coming weeks.

Read the full announcement:

WASHINGTON—U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) will implement the Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds final rule (“Final Rule”) on Feb. 24, 2020, except for in the State of Illinois where the rule remains enjoined by a federal court as of Jan. 30, 2020. Under the Final Rule, USCIS will look at the factors required under the law by Congress, like an alien’s age, health, income, education and skills, among others, in order to determine whether the alien is likely at any time to become a public charge.

The Final Rule, issued in August and originally scheduled to be effective in October, prescribes how DHS would determine whether an alien is inadmissible to the United States based on the alien’s likelihood of becoming a public charge at any time in the future, as set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Final Rule also addresses USCIS’ authority to issue public charge bonds in the context of applications for adjustment of status. Finally, the Final Rule includes a requirement that aliens seeking and extension of stay of change of status demonstrate that they have not received public benefits over the designated threshold since obtaining the nonimmigrant status they seek to extend or change.

“Self-sufficiency is a core American value and has been part of immigration law for centuries. President Trump has called for long-standing immigration law to be enforced and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services is delivering on this promise to the American people,” said Ken Cuccinelli, the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy Secretary for DHS. “By requiring those seeking to come or stay in the United States to rely on their own resources, families and communities, we will encourage self-sufficiency, promote immigrant success and protect American taxpayers.”

Except for in the State of Illinois, USCIS will only apply the Final Rule to applications and petitions postmarked (or submitted electronically) on or after Feb. 24, 2020. For applications and petitions that are sent by commercial courier (e.g., UPS/FedEx/DHL), the postmark date is the date reflected on the courier receipt. The Final Rule prohibits DHS from considering an alien’s application for, certification or approval to receive, or receipt of certain non-cash public benefits before Oct. 15, 2019, when deciding whether the alien is likely at any time to become a public charge. In light of the duration of the recently-lifted nationwide injunctions and to promote clarity and fairness to the public, DHS will now treat this prohibition as applying to such public benefits received before Feb. 24, 2020. Similarly, the Final Rule prohibits DHS from considering the receipt of public benefits by applicants for extension of stay and change of status before Oct. 15, 2019 when determining whether the public benefits condition applies, and DHS will now treat this prohibition as applying to public benefits received on or after Feb. 24, 2020.

USCIS will post updated forms, submission instructions, and Policy Manual guidance on the USCIS website during the week of Feb. 3, 2020, to give applicants, petitioners, and others ample time to review updated procedures and adjust filing methods. After Feb. 24, 2020, everywhere except in the State of Illinois, USCIS will reject prior editions of forms if the form is postmarked on or after Feb. 24, 2020. If USCIS receives an application or petition for benefits using incorrect editions of the forms, USCIS will inform the applicant or petitioner of the need to submit a new application or petition using the correct forms.

USCIS will continue to release information through its website in the weeks leading to the rule’s implementation date, including in the event that the injunction Illinois is lifted. This will include an update to the USCIS Policy Manual.

In the coming weeks, the agency is planning to hold a public engagement for immigration attorneys, industry representatives, and other relevant groups to discuss the final rule.

DHS remains enjoined from implementing the Final Rule in the State of Illinois. Should the injunction in Illinois be lifted, USCIS will provide additional public guidance.

https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscis-announces-public-charge-rule-implementation-following-supreme-court-stay-nationwide-injunctions

Supreme Court Allows Public Charge Rule to be Implemented

The Supreme Court decided on January 27, 2020, to issue a stay of an injunction against the “public charge rule.” What does all that mean? Essentially, the Trump Administration created a new rule that would have applied to many immigrants in the United States, particularly those seeking green cards. The rule was announced on August 14, 2019 and was set to become effective on October 15, 2019. Before that could happen, several federal district courts issued what are called “injunctions” against the rule, preventing it from going into effect. Since that time, immigration has not been able to start applying the rule.

The Supreme Court’s decision is not a final decision on the rule itself, which will likely work its way through the federal court system first. This decision is only related to an application for a “stay,” which is essentially a court order to temporarily stop a lower court’s action. Put another way, the Supreme Court undid the decisions of the lower courts, and since those decisions were all that held back the new rule, that rule will likely go into effect soon.

Why did the Supreme Court do this? The Court issued a decision explaining it’s reasoning, but not a full decision as is done at the end of a case. These kinds of decisions rarely involve a thorough discussion of the legal issues involved; rather, they deal with whether a rule goes into effect while it is challenged in the courts. You can read the decision below:

The decision was made on a 5-4 split, meaning that it was very divisive. The sole opinion reflects growing concerns about court injunctions which have nationwide impact. The four dissenting justices did not write to explain their reasoning, which is typical. Justice Gorsuch wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, which sheds some light on what at least two of the Justices were thinking. A short summary of the key points is:

  • Justice Gorsuch is clearly annoyed by district court judges preventing the government from implementing a rule, applying that relief to everyone without regard to where they live or whether they were part of the lawsuit in question
  • The decision is an outcome of the increasing use of injunctions, which follows directly from the Trump Administration’s push to modify the immigration system via regulations to the greatest extent possible, often pushing the boundaries of the law and always creating litigation
  • Justice Gorsuch appears to believe that only the parties to a case should be implicated in an injunction of a rule such as this one, and seems to yearn for an opportunity to curb the practice in general

These are interesting issues, and there is no doubt that future cases might present an opportunity for the Supreme Court to cut back on the lower courts’ ability to issue injunctions. At the same time, the practice of injunctions seems to follow directly from the increased use of substantive rule-making by various administrations, including Trump and Obama, which also have nationwide impact and affect millions of people.

There is a very good reason to prevent the government from implementing a controversial new rule while the issue is reviewed in the courts – the rule might be unconstitutional. It may in practice frustrate an administration’s ability to implement its will, as it did preventing Obama from implementing his DAPA program. But there is nothing preventing the Circuit Courts of Appeals from issuing their own stays, as happened here in several cases, nor the Supreme Court from stepping it on its own. The federal government is certainly in a better position to litigate these matters than the millions of people who would otherwise have to sue individually to get individual injunctions, as Justice Gorsuch seems to favor. Despite his concerns, this does seem more efficient than the alternative he appears to favor.

What is the practical effect of this decision? At the moment, nothing has changed. But it is likely that USCIS will announce a date to begin implementing the rule, with all of its substantive changes, within days or weeks. That is significant. That announcement will likely appear on USCIS’ website. It appears that the decision does not extend to the injunction that applies in the state of Illinois, for the moment, but since the rule has not yet been implemented anywhere it’s best to wait and see how immigration interprets it with regard to the geographic impact.

What should attorneys and applicants be doing now? File your applications. If you are sitting on any adjustment of status that might be affected by this rule, it likely needs to be mailed immediately. The rule’s implementation will mean that many forms need to be redone, entirely new forms and fees will be required, and some people might even be denied based on the public charge grounds. Anyone who is still in the process of preparing an application needs to re-evaluate their eligibility, what forms are likely to require changes, and discuss those things with an attorney.

BIA Decision on Continuances, Matter of Mayen

The Board of Immigration Appeals issued a decision on January 22, 2020, titled Matter of Mayen, 27 I&N Dec. 755. This decision came following an appeal by an individual denied a continuance in immigration court. The reason for requesting the continuance was to allow time for USCIS to adjudicate a pending U Nonimmigrant Status Petition, usually called a U Visa.

This decision is significant because the Trump Administration has struggled to increase the speed at which cases are decided in immigration court, and with it the number of people who can be deported. That has largely failed as the number of cases in court has skyrocketed past one million and many cases still take years to process. Reducing the number of continuances granted has been a big goal.

Additionally, under a former decision titled Matter of Sanchez Sosa, 25 I&N Dec. 807 (BIA 2012), which created a kind of presumption of exercising discretion to continue a case if there is a pending U Visa application so long as it is considered “prima facie approvable.” That typically meant that if it was likely to be approved or USCIS had indicated that it would approve it, if not for lack of visas, the case should generally be continued.

The decision in Matter of Mayen does not overrule this important decision, but it does confuse the issue enough that it will likely harm people trying to continue cases based on pending U Visas. People in immigration court proceedings will likely be hearing many of the same factors cited in Matter of Mayen in the coming months and years, such as:

  • Lack of diligence in pursuing a U Visa, such as waiting years after a crime was committed to file, will count against continuances
  • Uncertainty about when a visa could be issued, a real concern when waiting times might be over a decade
  • DHS’ opposition to continuances, which are now generally certain
  • An individuals status as being in custody weighing in favor of speedy cases
  • The speculative and indefinite nature of continuance requests
  • Denying a continuance does not actually case the individual prejudice

How might individuals respond to these issues in their own cases? Most likely their lawyers will have to cope with the endlessly increasing burden of proving every single element of every case, as is occurring in many areas of immigration law. Some potential reactions to this new decision might include:

  • Affirmatively documenting the reasons why someone was not diligent in filing a U Visa when a crime was committed, such as not knowing about the U Visa as a form of relief or for other reasons
  • Explaining why being detained is not always contrary to an individual’s interest, especially if they fear persecution, torture and death in another country
  • U Visa relief is not always speculative if it is a prima facie showing
  • The indefinite nature of continuance requests is actually due to the government removing immigration judges’ ability to administratively close cases or otherwise manage cases that might be pending for years
  • Denying a continuance does result in actual prejudice because USCIS typically issues deferred action notices and work permits to those with approvable cases, and the delay in doing so is entirely on USCIS’ side

USCIS Begins Accepting Green Card Applications for Certain Liberians

On December 26, 2019, USCIS announced that it had begun accepting application for adjustment of status based on the new law passed December 20th. It also provided some information about who is eligible or ineligible for the program. While this new law only applies to Liberians and their families, it contains some very generous provisions that might extend to non-Liberian family and even adult children. Schedule a consultation today to learn more.

Read the full announcement below:

Today, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services announced that it will begin accepting applications to adjust status to lawful permanent resident from certain Liberian nationals under Section 7611 of the National Defense Authorization Act (PDF) for fiscal year 2020, Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness (LRIF), signed into law on Dec. 20, 2019.

To be eligible for permanent residence (a Green Card) under LRIF, a Liberian national must have been continuously physically present in the United States from Nov. 20, 2014, to the date they properly file an application for adjustment of status. USCIS will accept properly filed applications until Dec. 20, 2020, one year from the enactment of the LRIF.

Applicants must be otherwise eligible to receive an immigrant visa and be admissible to the United States. The spouses, unmarried children under 21, and unmarried sons and daughters 21 or older of eligible Liberian nationals are also eligible for Green Cards.

The following grounds of inadmissibility do not apply to applicants under the LRIF:
– Public Charge (INA 212(a)(4));
– Labor Certification Requirements (INA 212(a)(5));
– Aliens Present Without Admission or Parole (INA 212(a)(6)(A)); and
– Documentation Requirements (INA 212(a)(7)(A).

Aliens are ineligible under LRIF if they have:

– Been convicted of any aggravated felony;
– Been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense); or
– Ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.

For more information about filing for adjustment of status under the LRIF, see the LRIF page on the USCIS website and for Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status.

LRIF, Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness relief for certain Liberians and their family

Green Cards

Time is running out for certain Liberians and their family to apply for Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness green cards! All applications must be filed by December 20, 2020 to be considered. USCIS has stated that applications must be received by them by this date in order to be considered. Read more about USCIS’ official guidance at https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-eligibility/liberian-refugee-immigration-fairness.

What is LRIF, the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness statute?

The National Defense Authorization Act signed into law on December 20, 2019, allows a new way for certain Liberians and their family to become lawful permanent residents. This means that some Liberians are now eligible for a special path to getting a green card. The new law only authorizes eligible people to file for one year, meaning that it is essential for anyone who might qualify for this process to review their eligibility and file their applications as soon as possible.

The law contains several important features:

  • Exempts applicants from the grounds of inadmissibility found in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) at Section 212(a)(4), (5), (6)(A), and (7)(A). This includes people who might normally be considered a “public charge,” who entered the US without authorization or admission, and who lack valid travel documents such as a passport
  • Allows adjustment of status even for those who have been ordered removed, deported, or excluded from the US
  • Requires continuous presence in the US from November 20, 2014 onward
  • Allows for a stay of removal for those with pending applications
  • Prevents the government from deporting many people who have pending applications
  • Allows for those with pending applications to work
  • Does not impact the number of visas available to other visa applicants

Anyone who believes they might be included should consult with an immigration attorney to review their situation.

USCIS Update on Travel with TPS

USCIS announced changes to its policy manual on December 20, 2019, relating to Temporary Protected Status (TPS) beneficiaries who travel outside the United States. TPS is a special type of status that is governed by different rules under the law. Some TPS recipients were in removal proceedings and some were even ordered removed before getting TPS approved. Nevertheless, many with TPS can travel with advance parole approval and return to the US. This creates special circumstances because traveling with an outstanding order of removal usually executes that order, preventing one from returning to the US. It also creates uncommon jurisdictional issues in determining whether a person would later file for adjustment of status (a green card) in court or with USCIS. Today’s announcement clarifies USCIS’ position on those issues.

Read the full announcement below:

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services is updating the USCIS Policy Manual to clarify the effect of travel outside the United States by Temporary Protected Status (TPS) beneficiaries who are subject to removal proceedings.

In particular, this update covers beneficiaries who have final removal orders, and who depart the United States and return with an advance parole travel document. TPS beneficiaries in removal proceedings who travel abroad temporarily with the authorization of DHS remain subject to those removal proceedings. If they are under a final order of removal, the travel does not execute or fulfill the order. The alien in question remains subject to the removal order.   

The Executive Office for Immigration Review of the Department of Justice will generally have jurisdiction over an adjustment of status application filed by a TPS beneficiary subject to removal proceedings. USCIS continues to have jurisdiction over requests from aliens initially paroled into the United States. By statute, upon return to the United States with TPS travel authorization, TPS beneficiaries retain the same immigration status they held before departing the United States.

USCIS Expands Unlawful Acts for Naturalization

USCIS announced changes to acts that are considered “unlawful” for purposes of determining “good moral character.” This is an important change that affects several different types of benefits, including naturalization applications for people applying for US Citizenship. Any person who believes they have ever had issues with any of the new unlawful acts should seek legal counsel before applying for naturalization.

Read the full announcement below:

WASHINGTON— Today, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services expanded its policy guidance regarding unlawful acts that may prevent an applicant from meeting the good moral character (GMC) requirement for naturalization. The commission of, or conviction or imprisonment for, an unlawful act, during the statutory period for naturalization, may render an applicant ineligible for naturalization should the act be found to adversely reflect on moral character.  

Previously, the USCIS Policy Manual did not include extensive information on unlawful acts. This update to the Policy Manual provides additional examples of unlawful acts and instructions to ensure USCIS adjudicators make uniform and fair determinations, and further identifies unlawful acts that may affect GMC based on judicial precedent. This update does not change the impact of an unlawful act on USCIS’ analysis of whether an applicant can demonstrate GMC. Adjudicators in the field receive extensive training to apply the law on GMC and unlawful acts regulation. They are aware of which unlawful acts could bar an applicant from naturalization and are not limited by the examples listed in the Policy Manual.

On Dec. 10, USCIS issued separate policy guidance in the USCIS Policy Manual about how two or more convictions for driving under the influence or post-sentencing changes to criminal sentencing might affect GMC determinations.

“In the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress determined that good moral character is a requirement for naturalization,” said USCIS Deputy Director Mark Koumans. “USCIS is committed to faithfully administering our nation’s lawful immigration system, and this update helps to ensure that our agency’s adjudicators make uniform and fair decisions concerning the consideration of unlawful acts on good moral character when determining eligibility for U.S. citizenship.”

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), an applicant for naturalization must establish GMC. Although the INA does not directly define GMC, it does describe certain acts that bar establishing GMC of an applicant. Examples of unlawful acts recognized by case law as barring GMC include, but are not limited to, the following:

bail jumping;

bank fraud;

conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance;

failure to file or pay taxes;

false claim to U.S. citizenship;

falsification of records;

forgery uttering;

insurance fraud;

obstruction of justice;

sexual assault;

Social Security fraud;

unlawful harassment;

unlawful registration to vote;

unlawful voting; and

violation of a U.S. embargo.

In general, applicants must show they have been, and continue to be, people of GMC during the statutory period before filing for naturalization and up until they take the Oath of Allegiance. The statutory period is generally five years for permanent residents of the United States, three years for applicants married to a U.S. citizen, and one year for certain applicants applying on the basis of qualifying U.S. military service.

USCIS officers must continue to perform a case-by-case analysis to determine whether an act is unlawful and adversely reflects on an applicant’s good moral character. They must also determine whether there are extenuating circumstances. An extenuating circumstance must pertain to the unlawful act and must precede or be contemporaneous with the commission of the unlawful act. Training for adjudicators will be updated to reflect this expanded guidance.

For more information on USCIS and its programs, please visit uscis.gov or follow us on Twitter (@uscis), Instagram (/uscis), YouTube (/uscis), Facebook (/uscis), and LinkedIn (/uscis).